演讲题目：Quality Disclosure under Consumer Loss Aversion

演讲人：张建强副教授

演讲时间：12月16日（周三）晚 18:30-20:00

演讲地点：在线腾讯会议ID：261 234 587

 报告摘要：Consumers experience a sense of loss when a product's quality does not match their expectations. To alleviate consumer loss aversion (CLA), firms can disclose information to reduce consumers' uncertainty about product quality and the resulting psychological loss. In this research, we investigate the implications of CLA on firm profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare when firms endogenously make quality disclosure decisions. We find that CLA leads symmetric firms to disclose quality more often. Given that CLA weakly reduces consumers'  utility from buying a product and quality disclosure is costly, intuition suggests that CLA is detrimental to firms. We find that this intuition is only true in a monopoly. Surprisingly, CLA makes both firms in a competition better off. Moreover, CLA increases firms' profit when they invest in quality disclosure instead of money-back guarantees to respond to CLA. We also find that CLA decreases consumer surplus and social welfare. Therefore, educating consumers to improve decision-making skills by deliberating on future outcomes and emotions can benefit firms at the cost of consumers and society.

演讲人简介：张建强，江苏师范大学副教授，东南大学管理学博士，德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校、印第安纳大学访问学者。曾获江苏省优秀博士学位论文，入选江苏高校“青蓝工程”优秀青年骨干教师。在Management Science、Omega、European Journal of Operational Research、International Journal of Production Research、Quantitative Marketing and Economics、Marketing Letters、Information Economics and Policy等学术期刊上发表多篇论文，担任国际、国内权威期刊的审稿人，担任国家自然科学基金项目通讯评审专家。主持国家自然科学基金项目、教育部人文社会科学项目、江苏高校哲学社会科学项目等课题。研究方向主要为运营与营销管理。