报告人:姜力,教授(香港理工大学)
时 间:11月17日(星期四)晚上18:00-19:30
地 点:经管学院335会议室
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报告简介:
We consider a healthcare system consisting of a doctor and a continuum of patients. Each patient can be in either a serious or minor medical condition and the doctor can have either a high or low qualification. The chance for the patient to be in a serious condition and that for the doctor to have a high qualification are common knowledge. The doctor knows her real qualification and, through a costless diagnosis, learns about the patient’s condition, which however remain privy to the patient himself. She offers a price menu that stipulates treatment charges (pricing strategy) and, after learning the patient’s condition, recommends a treatment with the associated charge from the price menu (recommendation strategy), for the objective of maximizing her profit. The patient accepts the recommended treatment if the service charge is less than the value he expects to receive based on his updated belief of the doctor’s qualification and his condition. Our results indicate that, given treatment costs, the value of the treatment provided by the two types of doctors, in both absolute and relative terms, determines the doctor’s strategies in pricing and treatment recommendation and the patient’s strategy in accepting the recommendation, which influence market outcome. Circumstances exist in which the doctor lies about the patient’s condition by recommending an overtreatment or the patient declines service. Importantly, we demonstrate that more private information held by the doctor has mixed implications for the patients in the two conditions and can improve social welfare under certain circumstance.
Joint work with C. Gao
报告人简介:
Li Jiang obtained his PhD in Operations and Management Science from the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan. In January 2007, he joined the Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. His main research interests are supply chain modeling and analysis with the focus on procurement, capacity management, information asymmetry, and behavioral operations. He has published in Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management and Operations Research Letters. He also reviews manuscripts and serves as guest associate editors for these journals.