报告题目：Tacit collusion between two terminals of a port

报告人：黄荣兵（上海海事大学讲座教授，York大学管理科学副教授）

时间：6月1日上午10:15

地点：经管335室

Abstract

For the past many years, a dual-track system has been implemented on port charges in mainland China. The vast majority of container ports refer to the standard rates specified by China’s Ministry of Transport, which released the container stevedoring rates for the first time on September 1, 1976. After a total of thirteen times of rate adjustments, the latest was modified on December 24, 2001, but still at a lower level comparing to the international average. Notice of Liberalization Port Competitive Service Charges was issued by China’s Ministry of Transport and National Development and Reform Commission on November 22, 2014, transforming the rates from governmental guidance and uniform pricing into market regulation. On the other hand, with joint venture terminals established to obtain substantial capital investment required, the separation of ownership and operation of container terminals will make price competition fierce among container terminals in one port area. In this study we analyze in detail price matching policies of two container terminals in one port area. Our main finding is that price matching strategies facilitate tacit collusion between container terminals.

     黄荣兵教授毕业于加拿大多伦多大学的Rotman管理学院，获运营管理专业博士学位。主要从事多目标与多种类设施的选址研究、物流网络优化及供应链优化研究。论文主要发表于运筹学类杂志，如IIE Transactions, Transportation Science, European Journal of Operational Research, Computers & Operations Research, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research， Journal of Operational Research Society等。